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Abstract 
 
 
According to the Bush Administration (www.whitehouse.gov), the U.S. tort system is expensive (the U.S. 
spends over $230 billions a year on tort lawsuits), economically distorting (the costs of litigation per person 
in the U.S. are far higher than in any other major industrialized nation in the world; litigation costs small 
businesses, on average, about $150,000 per year) and inefficient (over half of the compensation is eaten up 
by litigation costs). President Bush supports enactment of medical liability reform, class action liability 
reform, and asbestos litigation reform to curb the costs of lawsuits in the American legal system. 
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Tort reform is a priority issue in the second term of the Bush Administration, as he remarked at 
the 2004 Republican National Convention on September 2, 2004. Bush’s agenda on tort reform 
focuses on three major issues:  
 
1. Medical Liability  
 
Medical liability reform has motivated a sharp division between several groups of 
interest. On one hand, doctors, health care providers and insurance companies support 
Bush’s agenda on tort reform, whereas, on the other hand, victims and trial lawyers are 
against it. 
 
2. Class Action Lawsuits 
 
The same sharp division can be seen on class action lawsuit reform, where corporations 
support it and victims, trial lawyers, public interest organizations, and even state and 
federal judges are against it. 
 
3. Asbestos Litigation 
 
Similarly, asbestos litigation reform is strongly supported by asbestos-related companies 
and insurance companies, while trial lawyers and victims are the leading opponents. 
 
Bush proposals, as well as its advantages and objections, can only be explained in the context of 
the current U.S. tort system. Many tort cases are decided by juries which tend to grant larger 
awards than courts do. Furthermore, punitive damages can be imposed under proper 
circumstances to punish defendants for wilfully malicious wrongful acts that go beyond mere 
negligence, thus resulting in even larger awards. Trial lawyers are paid on a contingency fee 
basis. The judiciary system is decentralized and divided into state and federal courts, which may 
lead parties to abuse the rules of jurisdiction and forum shopping.  
 
The insurance industry is a powerful agent in the U.S. health care system. Patients can only 
access health care by buying health insurance (according to the American Trial Lawyers 
Association, ATLA, 43 million Americans do not have any health insurance); doctors and health 
care providers buy malpractice insurance to face their eventual liabilities. Therefore, insurers 
decide whether patients get the tests and treatment they need, how doctors practice medicine, 
how much doctors are paid for their services, and decide how much doctors pay for medical 
malpractice insurance. 
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1. Medical Liability  
 
«There is too many lawsuits around this country that are driving too many good doctors out of practice, that are 
driving up the cost of medicine. The cost of practicing defensive medicine in order to stay out of the courthouse or 
to defend -- to provide the defense necessary in case of a frivolous lawsuit is costing you $28 billion a year at the 
federal level. And it's a problem. And I look forward to working with Congress to solve this medical liability issue.» 
George W. Bush, Clinton (Michigan), January 7, 2004. 
 
Bush links medical liability reform to the improvement of the quality of health care. To that end, 
medical malpractice liability reform seeks increasing access to health care while enhancing the 
quality even further and constraining the rising costs. To achieve these objectives, Bush proposes 
a cap on judgments, arguing that it will reduce insurance premiums, thereby reducing defensive 
medicine and, consequently, total U.S. health care costs.  
 
Bush proposal on caps is twofold: 
 
9 Capping non-economic damages at $250,000, regardless of the number of defendants or the 
number of separate claims brought for the same injury.  
 
9 Reserving punitive damages for egregious cases where they are justified, and limiting them 
to reasonable amounts. 
 
Advocates and opponents of caps on judgments argue the following:  
 
• Effects on health care costs 
 
⇒ According to the American Medical Association (AMA), medical liability costs have risen 
an average of 11.9 percent a year since 1975, outpacing increases in overall U.S. tort costs, 
representing 9.3 percent (AMA, “Medical Liability Reform – NOW!”, December 3, 2004, 
p. 6). 
 
⇒ The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports that malpractice costs represent less than 
2 percent of overall health care spending (CBO, “Limiting Tort Liability for Medical 
Malpractice”, January 8, 2004, p. 6). The ATLA relies on this report to break down Bush’s 
arguments (Todd A. SMITH, “Bush Administration Fakes ‘Crisis’. Rather Than Solving 
The Real Health Care Problems Facing American Families”, January 4, 2005).  
 
• Effects on insurance premiums 
 
⇒ Insurance and medical lobbies support capping awards on the basis of the experience of 
the California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975, the first 
legislation to limit non-economic payments to $250,000, as a way to resolve the 
malpractice premium crisis. According to the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners data, California’s medical malpractice premiums have increased 245 
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percent between 1975 and 2002, while the rest of the nation’s medical malpractice 
premiums have increased 750 percent (AMA, Idem, p. 48). According to the CBO, recent 
studies examining state data from 1993 to 2002 have concluded that capping judgments 
would reduce premiums by more than one-third (CBO, Idem, pp. 5-6). 
 
⇒ Costs of malpractice premiums are only about 1 percent of total U.S. health care costs 
(ATLA, “Fact Sheet: Story Behind Rising Health-Care Costs: What the Bush 
Administration Doesn’t Want You to Know about Insurance Companies’ Special 
Treatment”) and, contrary to what Bush sustains, premiums would not increase total 
health care costs, insofar as physicians are unable to pass the cost of premiums onto their 
patients or their patients’ insurers (Richard POSNER, “Tort Reform”, The Becker-Posner 
Blog, January 16, 2005). Moreover, as Professor POSNER points out in his blog, «it is 
simplistic to assume that the total annual malpractice premiums paid is a good index of the net 
social cost of malpractice liability, or that measures to reduce those premiums by capping 
malpractice liability would result in a net improvement in welfare». Only a portion of the 
medical malpractice premium represents the real cost of malpractice liability, namely 
that of lawyers and expert witnesses, while the remaining part represents simply a 
wealth transfer from physicians to patients. Thus, as Professor POSNER claims in his blog, 
«[i]nsofar as malpractice liability merely transfers wealth from physicians to (some) patients, 
aggregate costs are unaffected». 
  
Furthermore, the ATLA reports that premiums averaged across specialties (internal 
medicine, general surgery and ob/gyn) are 15.3 percent higher in states with caps 
(ATLA, “Medical Malpractice Insurance. Do Caps Reduce Malpractice Premiums?”, 
October 2003). Similarly, other studies show that states with caps had sharper increases 
in median annual premiums than states without caps (Martin D. WEISS et al., “Medical 
Malpractice Caps. The Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps on Physician Premiums, 
Claim Payout Levels, and Availability of Coverage”, June 2, 2003). 
 
Finally, a study by the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights (FTCR) points out 
that regulating rates of insurance companies rather than capping awards is the way of 
redressing the high premiums problem (FTCR, “How Insurance Reform Lowered 
Doctor’s Medical Malpractice Rates in California”, March 7, 2003). According to the 
ATLA, California’s medical malpractice liability premiums actually increased by 190 
percent in the 12 years following enactment of MICRA, and only decreased after 
California enacted Proposition 103 in 1988, which required State approval for increases in 
premium rates (ATLA, “The Ama’s ‘Crisis’ Is Not Real: Limiting Patients’ Rights Does 
Not Improve Care”, October 2004; against, see AMA, Idem, pp. 47-49). A different 
approach to reducing malpractice premiums by regulating the insurance market would 
be that proposed by Professor POSNER, who suggests that the system could be better 
improved by experience rating –-permitting, or even requiring, insurance companies to 
base malpractice premiums on the experience of the insured physician: «[t]hat would make 
malpractice liability a better engine for deterring malpractice –which in turn would reduce 
malpractice premiums by reducing the amount of malpractice» (Richard POSNER, Idem). 
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• Effects on compensation 
 
⇒ Caps for non-economic awards would curb out-of-control jury awards, thus making the 
medical liability system more fair and predictable. It is a fact that the scale of non-
economic damages has increased very quickly in comparison to the rate of increase in 
other kinds of damages. 
 
⇒ Capping non-economic awards limits compensation to people who are severely injured 
as a result of medical malpractice. In this respect, a recent survey by the RAND 
Corporation on the effects of caps instituted by MICRA on damage awards in California 
found that in verdicts involving death cases, victims’ jury-awarded compensation was 
reduced by MICRA 58 percent of the time, with a 49 percent median reduction in total 
compensation for those cases. The study also found that caps disproportionately affect 
women, children and the elderly (RAND, “Capping Non-Economic Awards in Medical 
Malpractice Trials. California Jury Verdicts Under MICRA”, 2004, pp. 47-48).  
 
Generally, others, like Prof. Anthony SEBOK, have argued that capping non-economic 
damages would just result in uncompensated and unaddressed victims. «So the argument 
against pain and suffering awards isn’t they are being lowered to represent actual pain and 
suffering. It is simply that society can’t afford to fully compensate victims of medical malpractice» 
(Anthony SEBOK, “Should Doctors Vote Against John Edwards? The Reasons Why 
Critiques of His Medical Malpractice Litigation Record Are Wrong”, July 26, 2004). 
 
• Effects on defensive medicine 
 
⇒ Limiting malpractice liability would reduce the practice of defensive medicine, resulting 
in savings in health care costs. 
 
⇒ It is controversial whether capping malpractice awards would reduce defensive 
medicine, because at least some so-called defensive medicine may be motivated less by 
liability concerns than by the income it generates for physicians or by the positive 
benefits to patients. Even assuming that caps would reduce defensive medicine, savings 
would be very small (CBO, Idem, p. 6). 
  
The remaining actions on medical liability reform proposed by Bush are the following:  
 
9 Securing the ability of injured patients to get quick unlimited compensation for their 
economic losses. 
 
9 Shortening the statute of limitations to ensure that old cases cannot be brought to court 
years after an event. 
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9 Abolishing joint and several liability to ensure that defendants pay judgments in 
proportion to their fault. 
 
9 Providing for payments of judgments over time rather than in a single lump sum, to 
ensure that appropriate payments are made when patients need them. 
 
 
2. Class Action Lawsuits 
 
«We need to reform the class-action lawsuit problem. We've got -- these lawsuits are being filed; they have an 
impact on our economy. They -- many times, the lawyers get the money and the people don't. They are -- these suits 
that have got interstate claimants really ought to be in the federal court. The system right now allows people to 
shop for a court of law that is convenient to their case, or place where they can find a sympathetic jury.» George 
W. Bush, Clinton (Michigan), January 7, 2004. 
 
Bush proposals aim at stopping abuses of the class action device that harm class members as well 
as defendants, adversely affect interstate commerce and, in the end, undermine public respect for 
the judicial system. An explosion of interstate class actions being filed in state courts has occurred 
in the past few years, some of which are called “judicial hellholes” or “magnet courts” for 
routinely favouring plaintiffs and approving settlements in which the lawyers receive large fee 
awards and the class members receive virtually nothing. It is not controversial that a class action 
reform to stop abuses is needed.  
 
Bush proposals have resulted in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 bill, introduced in the 
Senate by Charles E. GRASSLEY (R-IO) on January 25, 2005. The following are Bush proposals and 
a summary of the provisions in the bill: 
 
9 Curbing forum shopping by granting Federal Courts jurisdiction of large interstate class 
action lawsuits, as they typically affect more citizens, involve more money, and implicate 
more interstate commerce issues than any other types of lawsuits.  
 
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 would create federal jurisdiction over large multi-state class 
actions, that is, those class actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, there are at least 
100 class members, and any member of the class is a citizen of a different state from any defendant. 
 
9 Preventing victims from receiving awards of little or no value while class action lawyers 
receive large fees. 
 
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 would require that judges carefully review all coupon settlements 
and limit attorneys’ fees paid in such settlements to the value to class members of the coupons that are 
redeemed; carefully scrutinize net loss settlements in which the class members end up losing money; 
and ban settlements that provide greater sums to some class members solely because they are closer 
geographically to the court.
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⇒ Advocates of the reform claim that state courts may be more inclined to favour state 
plaintiffs, whereas federal courts would be fairer. State courts decide the claims of other 
states’ citizens under their own law, thus imposing its policy preferences. Furthermore, 
according to a recent study by Eric HELLAND and Alexander TABARROK (Eric HELLAND 
and Alexander TABARROK, “The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards”, 2002), 
judicial bias against out-of-state defendants is particularly common where state judges 
are elected, as they have strong incentives to redistribute wealth from those out-of-state 
defendants (nonvoters) to in-state plaintiffs (voters). Finally, moving cases to federal 
courts would ensure that state law be applied impartially and balancing competing 
interests of the various states represented by class members.  
 
⇒ According to the ATLA, rare state court abuses have been appropriately handled by state 
supreme courts and state legislatures (ATLA, “Don’t Let Class Action ‘Reform’ Deny 
Justice to Consumers”, January 2005). Moreover, federalizing class actions would 
exponentially delay the judicial process for injured consumers and other class actions 
plaintiffs because federal courts do not have the resources to handle complex issues of 
state law. Finally, federal courts are generally less willing to entertain complex civil 
litigation than state courts, thus very rarely certifying classes in complicated cases. 
 
 
3. Asbestos Litigation 
 
«We got a problem. The Supreme Court recognized [asbestos litigation] as a problem. They said it is a huge mass of 
-- huge mass of asbestos cases defies customary judicial administration and calls for national legislation. That's a 
better -- it's better that they define it than me. After all, these are all lawyers and judges; I'm not. But when they 
say -- the Supreme Court says we have a national problem, I think Congress needs to listen.» George W. Bush, 
Clinton (Michigan), January 7, 2004. 
 
Bush claims that at least 74 companies have been forced into bankruptcy because of asbestos-
related litigation that has cost more than $70 billion; the volume of asbestos lawsuits is beyond 
the capacity of U.S. courts to handle; and more than 100,000 new asbestos claims were filed in 
2004. The crisis originated by asbestos litigation is so serious that most senators believe that at 
least some reform should be enacted. 
 
Bush proposals on asbestos litigation will result in The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act 
of 2005 bill, which will most likely be introduced in the Senate by Arlen SPECTER (R-PA), the new 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, this week (The Economist, “Asbestos in America. A 
Bid to Bypass the Lawyers”, January 27, 2005). The following are Bush proposals and a summary 
of the provisions in the bill: 
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9 Creating a national industry-financed trust Fund, governed by no-fault principles, to 
compensate asbestos victims.  
 
The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005 would create a national industry-financed $140 
billion trust fund to compensate asbestos victims, providing $40 billion of front-end funding for the first 
five years. Companies would pay $90 billion and insurers would pay $46 billion. The last $4 billion 
would come from trust funds set up by firms already bankrupted by asbestos claims.  
 
The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005 would create a formula under which companies 
with big past liabilities would contribute more. Larger companies would also pay more than smaller 
ones with similar liabilities.  
 
9 Compensating only genuinely sick asbestos victims by applying appropriate medical 
standards to determine legitimate victims. 
 
9 Banning asbestos lawsuits. 
 
According to the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, victims would give up their right to 
sue for damages. However, the Act would allow victims to return to the courts if the fund goes 
bankrupt. 
 
⇒ The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the National Association of 
Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) have assumed Bush’s arguments. The latest has 
also argued that to date, the number of asbestos liability claims filed in the U.S. numbers 
more than 700,000, 600,000 of which are largely baseless claims brought by people who 
are not ill (The Economist, Idem). With tens of thousands of new claims filed each year, 
legal experts expect that the total number of lawsuits could eventually exceed 2.5 million. 
Additionally, some experts predict that asbestos liability could ultimately cost the U.S. 
economy more than $200 billion (NAMIC, “NAMIC Advocates Asbestos Reform”, April 
23, 2004). According to the National Association of Manufacturers, removing claims from 
the tort system is the only way to ensure that victims receive fair and prompt 
compensation, stop the bankruptcies and eliminate the fraud and uncertainty for both 
victims and defendant companies, as well as the enormous transaction costs (John M. 
ENGLER, “Engler Testimony on Draft Asbestos Legislation”, January 11, 2005). 
 
⇒ According to the NAM, the size of the fund should approach $200 billion 
(www.atla.org). Generally, critics of the asbestos reform point out that banning asbestos 
lawsuits is against the victims’ constitutional right to a jury trial. Similar reasoning 
would lead to oppose scheduling awards. 
 
Asbestos victims have proposed different alternatives to the implementation of a fund, 
since they consider that it will not be able to provide the needed protection. The 
Committee to Protect Mesothelioma Victims calls for a medical criteria/registry 
approach, requiring those seeking to sue for asbestos injury to first be screened under 
medical criteria determined by a third party. Experts have estimated that this approach 
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can reduce asbestos court cases by 90 percent (PRNewswire, “Victims Group Backs 
Alternative Approach to Asbestos Reform”, FindLaw, January 11, 2005). 
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